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In State v. Greene' six defendants were tried on the charge of
prison rioting and the possession of weapons with which to facilitate
an escape. During cross-examination the solicitor asked several defen-
dants if they knew of any reason why certain State's witnesses would
have testified against them if the statements made were not true. Objec-
tion was made to such questioning and was overruled. The supreme
court, in upholding the trial court's ruling, held that the State was
entitled to bring out the relationship between the witnesses and the
defendants, this being within the discretion of the trial judge. The court
further stated that in order to justify the granting of a new trial, it must
be shown not only that the trial judge committed error, but also that
the error was prejudicial and denied to the accused his right to a fair
trial.
In State v. Lee2 the court again dealt with the scope of cross-
examination. During the trial, at which the defendant was convicted of
manslaughter, a defense witness testified that he saw the defendant in
the decedent's store on the morning of his death, and that the defendant
was a part time employee of the decedent. Defense counsel then ob-
jected when the witness was cross-examined on the part time employ-
ment. The supreme court upheld the trial court's overruling of the
objection, saying that the trial judge may allow cross-examination on
collateral matters where such matters have been opened up on direct
examination. The general rule is that the scope of cross-examination
rests largely within the discretion of the trial court and, in the absence
of an abuse of such discretion, the supreme court will not interefere.3
In Lee the supreme court also reiterated the South Carolina law
in regard to cross-examinining without reserving an objection. The
defense counsel objected to testimony of a State's witness and his
objection was overruled. The court held that since the defense had later
cross-examined the witness on the point in question, without reserva-
tion of his objection, the objection was lost.
In the cases of State v. Willard4 and State v. Ham' the supreme
court held that by not objecting to the introduction of evidence at trial,
1. 180 S.E.2d 179 (S.C. 1971).
2. 255 S.C. 309, 178 S.E.2d 652 (1971).
3. State v. Swilling, 249 S.C. 541, 155 S.E.2d 607 (1967).
4. 255 S.C. 68, 177 S.E.2d 129 (1970).
5. 180 S.E.2d 628 (S.C. 1971).
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the defendants had waived their rights to complain, and such objections
could not be brought up for the first time on appeal. For a more
complete discussion of these cases, see the Criminal Procedure Survey.
II. OPINION EVIDENCE
A. Layman
In Sellers v. Public Savings Life Insurance Co.,6 an action to
recover under a life insurance policy, the deceased and another man
were driving in a pick-up truck when the truck skidded off the road into
a ditch. Apparently neither the deceased nor the passenger was injured
in the wreck. Assistance was obtained from a Mr. White who lived
nearby. After attempts to remove the truck from the ditch proved
unsuccessful, further attempts were abandoned for the night. Although
Mr. White and the passenger left, the deceased insisted on remaining
with the truck during the night. The next morning the deceased was
found dead, laying face down in the ditch with his head under the water
which was standing in the ditch. Under the terms of the life insurance
policy, the double indemnity benefit was paid if the insured accidentally
drowned; excluded from coverage was any injury as a result of the
insured being intoxicated.
At the trial, Mr. White was asked by defense counsel if, in his
opinion, the deceased was highly intoxicated when he was left with the
truck. Since a defense asserted by the defendant was that the deceased
was intoxicated, the supreme court held that it was error for the trial
court to refuse to allow the witness to give his opinion. The court stated
that a lay witness may testify whether or not, in his opinion, a person
was drunk or sober on a given occasion when observed by the witness,
and that the weight of such testimony is for the jury to decide.
In South Carolina Highway Department v. Wilson,' a highway
condemnation case, the supreme court held that it was the practice in
this state, in accordance with the general rule,' to allow a landowner,
who is familiar with his land and its value, to give his or her estimate
as to the value of the land, even though the owner is not an expert. The
court further noted that the extent and source of the witness's knowl-
6. 255 S.C. 251,178 S.E.2d 241 (1970).
7. 254 S.C. 360, 175 S.E.2d 391 (1970).
8. See 32 C.J.S. Evidence § 546 (116) (1964).
1971]
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edge as to allegedly comparable sales, used as a partial basis for the
opinion, would generally only affect the weight to be given to the
opinion evidence rather than its competency or admissibility. In this
case, the witness's knowledge as to the value in comparable sales was
gained, in part, from reading abstracts of recorded deeds prepared by
her attorney, as opposed to reading the recorded instruments herself.
The court held that such a method of acquiring knowledge affected
only the weight to be given to the testimony.
B. Expert
In State v. Ham,' the defendant was tried for the possession of
marijuana. At the trial, a laboratory technician of the South Carolina
State Law Enforcement Division testified as to the identity of the
marijuana taken from the defendant. The technician stated that he had
identified marijuana on numerous occasions and had seen it growing
in the fields. The court, in holding that the laboratory technician was
qualified to make the identification, stated that the law in this state
does not require a man to have a professional degree to qualify as an
expert. Such determinations rest in the discretion of the trial judge.6
Ill. IMPEACHMENT
A. Prior Inconsistent Statements
In Boston Old Colony Insurance Co. v. C. B. Prentiss & Co.." the
plaintiff was the insurer of trucks owned by one defendant and used in
his business, and the defendants included the owner of the trucks, the
owner's nephew and the injured party. The plaintiff was seeking a
declaratory judgment denying liability in an accident in which the own-
er's nephew, who was working for the owner and who was allowed to
take the truck home at night, was involved. The accident occurred at
night in a skating rink parking lot. The plaintiff claimed no liability
because the nephew was not acting in the scope of his employment
or with the owner's permission at the time of the accident. After the
accident, the owner, pursuant to South Carolina Code sections 46-722
and 723,12 filled out forms showing that the nephew was covered
9. 180 S.E.2d 628 (S.C. 1971).
10, Parks v. Morris Homes Corp., 245 S.C. 461, 141 S.E.2d 129 (1965); C.
MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 13 (1954).
11. 180 S.E.2d 653 (S.C. 1971).
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under his liability insurance to prevent having the nephew's license
suspended. The supreme court held that testimony as to the submission
of these forms was clearly relevant and admissible. Such testimony
reasonably gave rise to the inference that the owner himself, shortly
after the accident, certified to the Highway Department that his nep-
hew did have permission to drive the truck at the time of the accident.
Therefore, the court held, the testimony was admissible to impeach
testimony by both the owner and the nephew to the effect that the
nephew did not have such permission.
B. One's Own Witness
In State v. Lee 3 the supreme court upheld the trial court's declara-
tion of a State's witness to be a hdstile witness and the trial court's
allowing the prosecution to cross-examine. This aspect of the case is
dealt with more thoroughly in the Criminal Procedure Survey.
C. Bias
In two cases, State v. Lewis14 and State v. Lagerquist," the su-
preme court held that the testimony of co-defendants who had pled
guilty was not made inadmissible solely because they had not yet been
sentenced.
IV. COMPETENCY
The case of Burns v. Caughman" presented the court with a ques-
tion of novel impression with respect to the Deadman's Statute. 7 The
plaintiff, sister -of the deceased, was, seeking to recover for value of
services rendered in caring for her bfother while he was alive. At the
trial, the plaintiff was allowed to testify that she moved in with her
13. 258 S.C. 309, 178 S.E.2d 652 (1971).
14. 255 S.C. 466, 179 S.E.2d 616 (1971).
15. 180 S.E.2d 882 (S.C. 1971).
16. 255 S.C. 199, 178 S.E.2d 151 (1970).
17. S.C. CODE ANN. § 26-402 (1962), the pertinent wording being:
No party to an action or proceeding . . . shall be examined in regard to
any transaction or communication between such witness and a person at
the time of such examination deceased . . . as a witness against a party
then prosecuting or defending as executor or administrator . . . of such
deceased person . . . when such examination or any judgment or determi-
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brother and performed domestic services for him, and she testified as
to the nature, type and extent of the services.
The court, noting that the application of the term "transaction"
in such an instance was one of first impression, stated that the general
rule was:
[W]here the services are of a personal kind which by their very
nature had to be performed in the presence or with the knowledge
or consent of the deceased, so that the testimony would tend to
show the existence of an implied contract by the deceased to pay
for the services, the witness is prohibited to testify as to the services
rendered."
The court then held that general household and domestic chores
were of such a nature, and therefore testimony of such transactions was
inadmissible under the Deadman's Statute. However, the court further
held that the admission of the testimony was not prejudicial in this
case, because the defendant admitted that the plaintiff had rendered
such services.
V. PRIVILEGES
The cases decided during this survey period which involved pri-
vileges, dealt mainly with the constitutional aspects of allowing the
admission in evidence of confessions and evidence gained from search-
es.
In State v. Lee,"9 the defendant objected to the admission in evi-
dence of his confession. The trial court held an evidentiary hearing with
the jury absent, at which the trial judge found that the defendant had
been given all the warnings required by Miranda v. Arizona 20 and that
the confession was voluntarily given. The trial judge then instructed the
jury that they should consider the same issue and to disregard the
confession, unless they found that the State proved that the confession
was voluntarily made. The court held that such a procedure was in
accordance with United States Supreme Court guidelines set out in
Jackson v. Denno,2' and that the admission of the confession was not
error.
18. 255 S.C. 199, 203, 178 S.E.2d 151, 152 (1970), quoting from Annot., 155
A.L.R. 961, 970 (1944).
19. 255 S.C. 309, 178 S.E.2d 652 (1971).
20. 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
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The cases of State v. Funchess22 and State v. Duckson23 also con-
cerned admission in evidence of confessions. An extensive coverage of
these cases is found in the survey article on Criminal Procedure.
Rule 1 of the Defense of Indigents Act24 requires that every person
arrested for the commission of a crime, within the jurisdiction of the
Court of General Sessions be taken before the clerk of court or other
designated officer as soon as practicable for the purpose of securing the
accused the right to counsel. In State v. Bishop,25 the defendant ob-
jected to the admission of a confession made while in custody, but
before he was taken before the clerk of court. However, the supreme
court held that the purpose of the rule was to insure appointment of
counsel in a timely manner and not to impose a condition on the right
of police to interrogate a willing suspect in custody before he appears
before the clerk of court. Citing the principle of State v. Funchess,2 1
the court held that a confession resulting from such interrogation was
admissible in evidence so long as it was freely and voluntarily made and
the procedural safeguards of Miranda were met. Since the appeal did
not challenge the voluntariness of the confession, the court did not
consider the question of whether it should have been excluded on that
ground.
In the case of State v. Patrick,2Y the defendant entered a liquor
store with a knife in his belt and a "hold-up" note in his pocket. While
the operator was serving him, the defendant hit him over the head with
a pistol which had been laying on the counter. The operator grabbed a
pistol from beneath the counter and shot the defendant. The defendant
crawled from the store, but was found by the police a few minutes later
and taken to the Columbia Hospital. During the course of a search of
his clothing, in an effort to establish his identity so that the consent of
relatives to an emergency operation might be sought, the "hold-up"
note was found. At his trial for attempted armed robbery, the defen-
dant objected to the admission in evidence of the note. He claimed that
it was the fruit of an illegal arrest without a warrant for a misdemeanor
not committed in the presence of the arresting officer. The supreme
court rejected this contention, holding that the search was not being
22. 255 S.C. 385, 179 S.E.2d 25 (1971).
23. 255 S.C. 372, 179 S.E.2d 40 (1971).
24. Defense of Indigents Act, S.C. CODE ANN., Vol. 15, p. 4 9 (Supp. 1970).
25. 181 S.E.2d 477 (S.C. 1971).
26. 255 S.C. 385, 179 S.E.2d 25 (1971).
27. 255 S.C. 130, 177 S.E.2d 545 (1970).
19711
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conducted incident to arrest, but was incident to hospital procedures
to establish his identity and that the defendant was treated no differ-
ently from any helpless accident victim. In Patrick the court also held
that the note was not irrelevant, but was properly admitted in evidence
as a circumstance to be considered by the jury.
The cases of State v. McRae" and State v. Pollard"5 concerned the
admission in evidence of objects discovered during searches of automo-




In South Carolina the market price on property may be proved
by other sales in the neighborhood. The only limitation is that the trial
judge must exercise discretion in allowing in evidence only prior sales
fairly comparable in time, character and location.3' In the highway
condemnation case of South Carolina Highway Department v.
Wilson, 31 testimony was allowed on behalf of the landowners as to the
sale price of two properties sold approximately nine years prior to the
condemnation. There was also testimony that the witnesses had been
unable to discover any more recent sales of comparable properties. The
supreme court, in upholding the admission of the testimony, stated that
in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion amounting to an error of
law, the trial court's ruling would not be disturbed. Although the sales
were quite remote in time, the per acre prices of the sales were approxi-
mately one half of the per acre price claimed by the landowners as the
market value of their land, and therefore, there was no prejudice to the
Highway Department's case.
State v. Greene,32 a trial for prison rioting in which the supreme
court noted that ordinarily the prosecution cannot refer to other
charges which could have been brought against the defendant, held that
under the circumstances of the case, a comment by the solicitor that
28. 255 S.C. 287, 178 S.E.2d 666 (1971).
29. 255 S.C. 339, 179 S.E.2d 21 (1971).
30. J. DREHER, A GUIDE TO EVIDENCE LAW IN SOUTH CAROLINA 40 (1967), citing
S.C. Highway Dep't v. Hines, 234 S.C. 254, 107 S.E.2d 643 (1959).
31. 254 S.C. 360, 175 S.E.2d 391 (1970).
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more charges could have been lodged against the defendant was neither
prejudicial nor ground for a mistrial. The court stated that it was
obviously the intent of the solicitor to submit to the court the proposi-
tion that various acts of improper conduct and other offenses, assault
being specifically mentioned, went to make up a riot and that the State
could prove various offenses in making a riot charge. When viewed in
the light of the overall trial, there was no error.
In Greene the trial court allowed testimony as to the violent as-
sault by another inmate who had pled guilty and was not on trial. The
supreme court held that such testimony along with other testimony
that the inmate was acting together with two of the defendants, was
not improper to describe the conduct of those who participated in the
affray.
B. Demonstrative Evidence
In Senn v. J. S. Weeks & Co.,3 the court was faced with the
question of admissibility of photographs of reconstructed conditions at
the scene of an accident. The plaintiff was injured when a third party
failed to stop for a stop sign and entered an intersection striking the
plaintiff's automobile. The plaintiff claimed liability rested with the
defendant, because his truck was parked in a no parking zone obscur-
ing the stop sign from the view of persons entering the intersection from
the non-through street. At trial there was testimony as to the relative
heights and locations of the truck and stop sign. The trial court refused
to admit in evidence pictures taken by the defendant of his truck in
substantially the same position as indicated by the testimony and which
showed the view of the stop sign from the direction in which the third
party had been traveling. The supreme court, in holding that this was
error, stated that the similarity to the accident conditions made the
pictures competent and that they were relevant to the one basic and
vital issue in the case.
In the case of State v. Parker,4 in which the defendant was con-
victed of murder for stabbing a fellow prisoner, the defendant objected
to the introduction in evidence, as the murder weapon, of a blood-
stained knife which officials found in a garbage can in the ward shortly
after the crime was discovered. There was testimony by an eyewitness
33. 180 S.E.2d 336 (S.C. 1971).
34. 255 S.C. 359, 179 S.E.2d 31 (1971).
1971]
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that the defendant stabbed the deceased with a knife, wrapped the knife
in a rag and threw it in a trash can in the ward. There was further
testimony that the knife in evidence was the only knife found on the
ward. The supreme court, stating the general rule to be that an object
can be admitted in evidence only if it is shown to be relevant to the
proof of some fact in issue, and that it is relevant if there is evidence
showing that it is reasonably connected with the commission of the
crime charged, held that it was reasonably inferable that the knife
found in the ward was the weapon used by the defendant in the commis-
sion of the crime and consequently was properly admitted in evidence.
In State v. Seifried,3 a laboratory technician from the South Car-
olina State Law Enforcement Division testified that he found no pow-
der burns on the sweater and shirt of the prosecuting witness when he
examined them. The supreme court held that admission of such testi-
mony was not grounds for reversal since there was not testimony as to
actual tests on the clothing, only that the witness examined the articles
and saw no powder burns. Because there had been no tests, it was not
necessary that there be testimony that the clothing was in an unchanged
condition from the time of the shooting, that there be testimony show-
ing various factors affecting the presence or absence of powder burns,
or testimony showing the significance of such presence or absence.
The court held that: "the absence of burns was a mere physical fact
about which the jurors were at least as likely to speculate from their
own inspection of the garments in the jury room as from their con-




Many reasons have been given for the exclusion of hearsay evi-
dence, but the South Carolina Supreme Court has recently emphasized
the most important. 37
The teal basis for the exclusion, however, appears to lie in the fact
that hearsay testimony is not subject to the tests which can ordi-
narily be applied for the ascertainment of the truth of testimony
35. 255 S.C. 481, 179 S.E.2d 718 (1971).
36. Id. at 486, 179 S.E.2d at 720.
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S. I. Probably the most important objection to admitting hear-
say testimony in evidence is that the declarant is not present and
available for cross-examination. The exercise of the right to cross-
examine the witness is regarded as. . . essential in the administra-
tion of justice to discover the falsity of testimony and prevent the
admission of perjured testimony.as
This standard was applied in the case of State v. James9 to hold
in error the admission in evidence of a report of a urine analysis intro-
duced by a person other than the analyzer. A urine specimen had been
sent to a California laboratory for analysis for arsenic and only a
report of the analysis was offered in evidence by a local doctor. The
court stated that:
[W]here the results of tests or analyses are offered to prove an
essential element of a crime or connect a defendant directly with
the commission of a crime, such results must be substantiated by
the person who conducted the tests or analyses. Otherwise, the
effect of their admission would be to allow a witness to testify
without being subject to cross-examination, and thus deprive the
accused of his constitutional right to be confronted with and to
cross-examine the witness against him. 0
Since the testifying doctors could not testify as to the analysis used or
the identity and veracity of the tester, the report was hearsay and
admission of it in evidence was error.
In State v. Lee,4 the court held that evidence of previous threats
and hostile declarations by the accused against the deceased was admis-
sible to show malice, premeditation and state of mind.
In the similar homicide case of State v. Peterson,4" the court af-
firmed the admission in evidence of previous difficulties between the
accused and the deceased. The court stated that, provided the difficul-
ties were not too remote in time, the evidence was admissible for the
purpose of showing the animus of the parties and thereby aiding the
jury in determining who was the probable aggressor. But the court
emphasized, however, that the details of such difficulties were not ad-
missible.
38. Cooper Corp. v. Jeffcoat, 217 S.C. 489, 494, 61 S.E.2d 53, 55 (1950), quoting
from 20 Am. JUR. Evidence § 452 (1939).
39. 255 S.C. 365, 179 S.E.2d 41 (1971).
40. Id. at 370, 179 S.E.2d at 43.
41. 255 S.C. 309, 178 S.E.2d 652 (1971).
42. 180 S.E.2d 341 (S.C. 1971).
1971]
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In State v. Key43 the trial court allowed a witness to testify as to
a conversation he had with the mother of one of the defendants. The
witness testified that the mother told him: "Atlas [the defendant] said
he was going to take half of Rock Hill with him if he was sent off and
it would be best for me to just leave town on Sunday."44 The supreme
court held that allowing the testimony as to the conversation was error,
but the error was not prejudicial because there was conclusive proof of
the defendant's guilt of armed robbery.
B. Admissions of a Party Opponent
Three cases were decided this survey period involving the general
rule of law in South Carolina that if a party fails to call an available
witness, over whom he has control, to testify as to a material issue, an
inference may be drawn that the witness would have testified unfavora-
bly to that party.45 Two of the cases concerned the relationship between
the party and the witness necessary for the inference to arise.
In the case of Duckworth v. First National Bank"6 the court, after
first defining "control" as meaning only that the witness be in such a
relationship with the party that it is likely that his presence could be
procured, held that this indispensable element was missing since the
manager-fighter contract no longer existed between the plaintiff and
the uncalled witness at the time of the trial. In the second case, Sellers
v. Public Savings Life Insurance Co., 7 the supreme court held that
where the uncalled witness was neither an agent, employee, relation nor
associate of the defendant, and there was nothing to indicate that the
defendant exercised any degree of control over him, and that he was
just as available to the plaintiff as the defendant, the inference did not
arise that the witness' testimony would have been adverse to the defend-
ant.
The case of Canady v. Martschink Beer Distributors, Inc.4" was
an automobile accident case in which a passenger was suing the driver
for damages. There was evidence that the driver had been drinking, but
there was issue as to the extent of his drinking and the plaintiff's
43. 180 S.E.2d 888 (S.C. 1971).
44. Id. at 889.
45. J. DREHER, supra note 30, at 71.
46. 254 S.C. 563, 176 S.E.2d 297 (1970).
47. 255 S.C. 251, 178 S.E.2d 241 (1970).
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participation in the drinking. The plaintiff's brother had also been a
passenger in the car and, therefore, was an eye witness who could testify
as to the extent of the defendant's drinking and the participation of the
plaintiff in the drinking. Under these facts, the supreme court reversed
the trial court's ruling and held that the defendant was entitled to the
benefit of the presumption that, if the brother had testified, his testi-
mony would have been adverse to the plaintiff.
Another type of admission which comes within this exception to
the Hearsay Rule is the testimony of a party which is favorable to the
opposing party. The general rule is that if a party's uncontraverted
testimony is favorable to the adverse party, he may be precluded from
recovery on the basis of that testimony. 9
In Lytle v. Reagan,5 the defendant was appealing a verdict in
favor of the plaintiff, claiming that the plaintiff's testimony precluded
his recovery. The supreme court, while recognizing the existence of the
general rule in South Carolina, stated that when a party's testimony
consisted mainly of estimates, opinions and conclusions, rather than
actual facts within his knowledge, the testimony was not conclusive
upon him when there was other evidence tending to show his testimony
was not in accord with the facts. Different witnesses will give different
versions of the facts of the incident and the party was no different from
any other witness. Therefore, the court, in finding that the plaintiff's
testimony was no more than his version of the accident and thereby not
barring recovery, dismissed the appeal.
C. Spontaneous Declarations-Res Gestae
It is a well established rule in South Carolina that for a statement
to qualify under the res gestae rule it must be of such a character that
it explains the nature of the event or fact in issue.-" The supreme court
relied on this requirement in upholding the exclusion of a statement in
Anders v. Nash.52 In this case the plaintiff was injured when struck by
the defendant's car while crossing the street. The defendant objected to
the exclusion of testimony of a witness that the plaintiff's son, while
the plaintiff was still lying in the street, had said, "Mama, I told you
49. Crider v. Infinger Trans. Co., 248 S.C. 10, 148 S.E.2d 732 (1966).
50. 182 S.E.2d 302 (S.C. 1971).
51. See Bagwell v. McLellan Stores Co., 216 S.C. 207, 57 S.E.2d 257 (1949).
52. 180 S.E.2d 878 (S.C. 1971).
19711
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not to cross." However, the court ruled that even though the statement
was sufficiently close in point of time and place to be a part of the res
gestae, it did not explain the manner in which the plaintiff attempted
to cross the street or the manner in which the defendant was driving.
Consequently the statement amounted to no more than an irrelevant
opinion that the plaintiff should not have attempted to cross the street,
and it was properly excluded.
VII. PRESUMPTIONS
Only one case was found this survey period involving presump-
tions and that was the case of Moye v. Wilson Motors, Inc. 3 In this
case the plaintiff was issued an insurance policy which contained a
clause stating that the insurance company could cancel the policy at
any time by mailing the plaintiff a written notice of cancellation and
that the mailing of the notice was sufficient proof of notice. The insur-
ance company cancelled the policy by mailing a notice, but the plaintiff
claimed he never received the notice. The court found that since there
was testimony that the plaintiff had received a copy of the policy and
there had been no misrepresentation as to the cancellation clause, the
plaintiff could not charge fraud in the misrepresentation of the contents
of a written instrument. The plaintiff was charged with the knowledge
of facts which could have been ascertained by reading the policy, and
was presumed to know what was contained therein.
IX. HABEAS CORPUS PROCEEDINGS
In the case of State v. Stallings," over the defendant's objection,
the prosecution introduced the torn and blood stained clothing worn
by the victim at the time of the assault, and pictures of the victim after
the assault. The supreme court held that the evidence was admissible
since it was introduced to show the forcefulness of the assault, and not
solely to induce prejudice.
In Stallings v. State of South Carolina,'- the District Court, in
dismissing the defendant's habeas corpus petition, stated that as a
general rule the admissibility of evidence was to be governed by state
53. 254 S.C. 471, 176 S.E.2d 147 (1970).
54. 253 S.C. 451, 171 S.E.2d 588 (1970).
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law and may be reviewed only on appeal and not in a habeas corpus
proceeding.
It is only when the error in the admission of evidence is found to
be . . . so conspicuously prejudicial as to deprive the defendant
of a fair trial that a federal question is presented warranting fed-
eral intervention. 56
LAWRENCE B. ORR
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